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This paper finds that public debt and a range of other 
economic  variables  are  surprisingly  weakly  correlated  with 
sovereign spreads in EU countries. Democratic capital, on the 
other  hand,  was  a  powerful  predictor  of  spread  heights 
between  2003  and  2007,  while  its  relevance  disappeared  in 
late 2008, when only credit ratings were correlated with the 
investors' estimate of default probabilities.  
These  results  suggests  that  (1)  institutional 
characteristics  may  sometimes  play  a  central  role  in 
determining borrowing costs and (2) investors attach different 
weights  to  relevant  variables  depending  on  global 
macroeconomic conditions. 1 Introduction
\Our basis of knowledge for estimating the yield ten years hence of a
railway, a copper mine, a textile factory, the goodwill of a patent medicine, an
Atlantic liner, a building in the city of London amounts to little and sometimes
to nothing."
| John Maynard Keynes (1936)
What factors, in addition to public debt, determine the borrowing costs of advanced
countries? Are any macroeconomic variables more important, and do bond buyers look
beyond raw numbers and evaluate the political and institutional characteristics of coun-
tries, their historical experience with democracy, or even the democratic traditions in the
neighboring countries?
This paper attempts to answer these questions by examining the evolution of sovereign
spreads in the European Union since the rst group of its member states adopted the
common currency. The period covered in this paper includes the months of what has now
become known as the Great Recession. As we shall see the behavior of sovereign spreads
changed dramatically during the nancial crisis.
We know from recent studies that not only scal, but also political factors have
an impact on credit risk (Baldacci, Gupta, and Mati, 2008).1 Still, given very similar
long-term rates across euro area countries before 2008, it seemed natural to assume
that political factors should predominantly be a concern for emerging|not developed|
markets.Emerging economies are known to have low debt tolerance: they can easily lose
credibility at debt levels that would be viewed in a benign fashion if they were observed
in advanced economies.2
The assumption that members of the euro zone are credible debtors (reected in
low long-term interest rates and fairly low spreads over German bonds) came under
re in 2008, as the risk associated with holding many of the available assets had to
be reevaluated due to a wave of bankruptcies in the United States and elsewhere, and
as the spreads of numerous EU countries reached record heights (since the adoption of
the common currency). A vigorous debate ensued: some commentators suggested that
markets overreacted (De Grauwe, 2009) while others speculated that markets had simply
mispriced risk in the past (Greenspan, 2008, p. 507, among others, suggested that there
was an \underpricing of risk worldwide" before the crisis).
It is natural that owners of capital should \ee" to safe assets at a time of a crisis.
But why would they perceive the risk of country A with a debt-to-GDP ratio of less than
40% to be higher than the risk of country B with a debt-to-GDP ratio approaching 100%3
when both are members of the same club (EU) and use the same currency (implying that
1An early example of an empirical study aiming to explain risk premia (spreads over LIBOR) is
Edwards (1984), who found external debt and debt service to determine the ease of access to credit.
Since then, Reinhart and Rogo (2009) have emphasized that internal debt can be an equally powerful
source of future risk.
2The notion of debt (in)tolerance is due to Reinhart, Rogo, and Savastano (2003).
3Not even counting the liabilities of local governments within that country, which should probably
also fall under \public debt."
4there is no currency risk)?4 Or imagine two countries with debts 23% and 52% of their
respective GDP. Why could the latter (Portugal) borrow for 55 basis points less than the
former (Slovenia) in December 2008?5 It is this apparent puzzle that his paper seeks to
address.
This paper attempts to identify the sources of risk premia and, in the process, evalu-
ates three distinct hypotheses that have been advanced to explain recent events (complete
rationality, late correction and panic, addressed in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 respectively).
It presents evidence that a number of \obvious" variables that should inuence borrowing
costs of sovereigns (like debt levels and budgets decits) seem to have often mattered less
than institutional quality (or the reputation resulting from a long democratic tradition).
Section 1.1 gives a brief description of international capital markets, Section 2 sets
the stage by giving more background about the European bond market, Section 3 briey
evaluates unsatisfactory hypotheses, Section 4 introduces a simple model of the probabil-
ity of default, Section 5 describes the dataset used for testing the preferred hypothesis,
Section 6 presents the empirical results and Section 7 concludes.
1.1 What can we learn from sovereign spreads?
Countries can borrow from foreign and domestic institutions by issuing (often, but not
always, long-term) bonds but no two countries pay the same interest, even if they are
economically and politically similar. Conversely, countries with dierent historical expe-
riences and unequal macroeconomic conditions sometimes borrow at similar rates.
The usual explanation is that investors demand payment for additional risk, so long-
term interest rates vary because countries have dierent probabilities of default. In the
ecient market view, all market participants process available information in order to
assess these probabilities; while individual estimates may dier, those institutions that
are too optimistic will go out of business over time and the average guess reected in the
ocial market interest rate will be correct. Participants with biases could in principle
allow arbitrageurs to make temporary prots but the ocial rate should be an accurate
estimate of the objective probability of default, given the past and present performance
of a particular country.
One source of noise that needs to bring modesty on any analysis of interest rates is
that disentangling currency risk from default risk can be extremely challenging, since
countries often issue debt in their domestic currencies.6 Beliefs about the currency can
be an important source of interest rate variation: if the currency in which the debt is
issued is weak or expected to depreciate in the future then investors charge higher premia.
Even though exchange rates models are notoriously unreliable,7 many investors engage
in bets against (or \for") particular currencies, partly because they are able to charge
4This is an interesting question in the abstract, but actual countries can be easily substituted in the
text instead of letters. Slovakia (A) and Italy (B), for example, would work.
5Naturally, in addition to the present ratio of debt to GDP, the trend of its growth (or a possibility
that it may shrink) is also important. Empirical evidence presented later in the paper will generally
suggest, however, that there is little | if any | correlation between budget decits and borrowing costs.
6This paper uses the most reliable way of dealing with this issue by focusing on a currency union; the
obvious cost of this approach is it limits the sample size.
7The widely-known Meese and Rogo (1983) result is that a random walk performs as well as any
model of exchange rates.
5liquidity premia for the more obscure currencies.
A currency union is a particularly useful sample for studying borrowing costs because
relative currency risk does not exist: all countries in the union have the same currency
risk, so if the long-term rates of two countries are compared, they reect the dierence
in the probability of default. Relative rates (or spreads with respect to the strongest
member of the union) do not move because of changing expectations of the currency
outlook.
The sources of the variation of long-term interest rates in the eurozone, then, should
simply measure the probability of default, assuming, of course, that German debt is
riskless. (All EU countries are examined in this paper but EMU membership is generally
a control variable in the empirical analysis.) This paper explores (1) why sovereign
spreads vary across Europe and (2) why they rose sharply late 2008.
2 Motivation
\When an accident is waiting to happen, it eventually does."
| Reinhart and Rogo (2009)
The rapid increase in the spreads of sovereign debt within the euro area has recently
attracted considerable attention. De Grauwe (2009), for example, views the rising interest
rate dierentials as the result of a \panic in the nancial markets" and argues that it \is
dicult to understand ... why the market (and the rating agencies) forecast a default of
the Spanish government debt, while they do not forecast trouble for the UK, which has
a debt build up similar to Spain's and a more serious banking problem."8 In February
2009, Italy's Finance Minister Giulio Tremonti called for the creation of an \EU bond,"9
almost certainly motivated by the rising spreads, knowing that his country would pay less
for borrowing if the bonds were explicitly guaranteed by the whole monetary union.10
On the other hand, rising yields can be viewed in a positive light if they impose
discipline on governments (Bernoth, Hagen, and Schuknecht, 2004). Still, it can be
argued that scal restraint is not appropriate during a crisis (particularly if the latter is
demand-driven) so budgetary discipline could actually be counterproductive.
2.1 Other signs of turmoil
At the end of March 2009 the United Kingdom was not able to sell all of the bonds it tried
to auction (only 93% were successfully sold). By 2010, a group of prominent economists
warned the British government that \[i]n the absence of a credible plan, there is a risk
8His argument that markets simply made unreasonable predictions in 2009 led him to conclude that
the \ECB should privilege the buying of Irish, Greek, Spanish and Italian government bonds to eliminate
the distortions and the externalities" caused by the large spreads.
9\Now my feeling|I am speaking of a political issue not an economic issue|is ... we need a union
bond" (Giulio Tremonti, quoted in Willis, 2009).
10Still, some argue that, in spite of unfortunate timing, the creation of an EU \super-bond" has its
appeal because \a common eurozone market for government debt would be a powerful rival to the US
Treasury market and it could bring substantial nancial and economic benets" (M unchau, 2009).
6that a loss of condence in the UKs economic policy framework" which would result in
rising long-term interest, possibly accompanied with currency instability.11
In the summer 2009, Hungary was able to sell its ve-year (euro denominated) bonds
at 6.7% (in Hungarian Forints the rate would probably be around 10%). This rate
suggested at least a 3 percent per-year probability of default, even though the country
had recently been bailed out by the International Monetary Fund.
A month later, Paul Krugman warned that Austria's default was a real possibility
due to its exposure to Eastern European banks, magnifying the fears that the global
crisis could lead to a total collapse of the nancial system should a catastrophic scenario
materialize in Europe.
Compared to that worry, it is almost mundane that Poland was able to borrow at
strange rates in mid-2009. Specically, its rating was A at the time, but its long-term
rates on ten-year bonds were 6.3%, meaning and it had to pay 1% more per annum
than software rm Oracle which had the same rating. Although comparing countries to
companies can be very misleading, countries have multiple possible sources of funding,
both domestically and internationally, and they do not disappear from the map because
of a bankruptcy (reputational concerns, then, are stronger than in the corporate sphere
where a bankrupt company can simply be seized or liquidated). Countries do default but
corporate bankruptcies are on average much more common.
2.2 Could the hight of the spreads be warranted?
Skeptics of the European Monetary Union such as the late Milton Friedman would would
probably remark that even during the crisis the spreads of numerous EU countries were
too low. In the debates about the sustainability of the monetary union, those who found
it to be an overly ambitious project speculated that the euro zone would disintegrate
after a major global economic crisis.
Martin Feldstein has on numerous occasions argued that Europe's monetary union
is too heterogeneous and said at the January 2009 American Economic Association's
meeting that \the past decade has been, until recently, a lucky time in Europe," adding
that \the possibility of one or more countries choosing to withdraw from the EMU cannot
be ruled out" (quoted in Wall Street Journal, 2009).12
The heterogeneity of countries in Europe stems to a large degree from a sentiment
that \every country should determine for itself what kind of economic and social system it
wants."13 It follows that some countries will be more inclined than others to borrow large
quantities of money on international markets, hoping to achieve outcomes that markets
by themselves may be unable to provide.
One example is welfare or, more narrowly, payments to seniors through a public
pension system. Developed countries, partly as a result of democratically chosen policies
(and possibly a taste for altruism or solidarity), tend to have publicly funded pension
11The sentiment was expressed in a recent letter by Besley, Davies, Goodhart, Marcet, Pissarides,
Quah, Desai, Turnbull, Attanasio, Meghir, Vickers, Muellbauer, Newbery, Pesaran, Rogo, Sargent,
Sibert, Wickens, Bootle, and Rosewell (2010).
12It should be noted, however, that as of late 2009, the euro has actually attracted many buyers and
the Economist explained this development in June 2009 by writing that \the nancial crisis has made
the euro look more alluring."
13As articulated by Cooper (1990), an American.
7systems which can function well if the number of pension recipients is much smaller
than the number of workers. Problems arise when the constituency of older individuals
expecting pensions becomes so large that the pressures on the government budget make
it unable to pay benets without running persistent decits, assuming constant tax rates.
This can rst lead (old and potential) lenders to question the sustainability of the system
and could eventually result in outright insolvency. Many Western European countries
indeed face dicult choices due to their aging populations.
2.2.1 The role of the Euro
The deepening of the Euro bond market has been described as benecial to \the entire
world" (Rogo, 2005), but it also means the EU countries that have not yet joined the
monetary union can be viewed as less reliable and more risky. This skepticism could be
justied not only due to the volatility of their national currencies but also due to the fact
that a common currency encourages trade14 and due to lower pressures to respond quickly
to the crisis. For example, Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2008) warned that \a new political
and economic divide within Europe may emerge" because non euro-area EU members (1)
are macroeconomically vulnerable and (2) have had slow policy reactions to the crisis.15
Conversely, even the members of the monetary union can lack credibility due to the
absence of scal coordination or of some kind of federal institution which would be able
to make nancial choices (specically, decisions to bail out an unlucky or irresponsible
member of the union) quickly and without the need for approval of national governments.
2.2.2 A rational ight to safety
Not surprisingly, when frequency and volume of private transactions decrease (as hap-
pens during nancial crisis), bonds of (some) governments become more popular among
investors than corporate bonds. If most investors interested in holding euro-denominated
bonds simply stopped buying other than German debt then the rise of spreads across
the European Union would be a natural consequence of that choice. Indeed, consistent
with the hypothesis that risk tolerance fell dramatically in 2008 is a report by the ECB
(2009) which states that loans of monetary and nancial institutions to the private sector
contracted in early 2009.16
2.2.3 An implicit guarantee?
Naturally, investors may expect that countries in distress (having diculties with interest
payments) will be supported by the large (or macroeconomically healthier) members of
the monetary union. One source of the 2008 increase in rates (and spreads) could be that
this expectation was terminated (or that the likelihood of bailouts decreased).
14Transaction costs are lower (e.g. Alesina and Barro, 2002; Rose, 2001).
15Alesina and Grilli (1993) were already skeptical about the consequences of a \multi-speed" European
Monetary Union.
16\In the rst quarter of 2009 the annual growth rate of MFI credit to general government increased
signicantly to stand at 5.7%, up from 1.7% in the previous quarter" (ECB, 2009, p.21).
82.3 A word of caution
It is easy to over-interpret events, nd explanations in random shocks, or speculate about
the importance of history.
Oakley and Parker (2010), for example, explain the underperformance of British bonds
in late 2009 and early 2010 by the fact that the result of parliamentary elections may not
be a suciently decisive victory by the Tories: while it is true that governments can act
more quickly when their legitimacy is indisputable and election results are decisive, it is
far from clear that markets punished the UK because of the then recent opinion polls.
Global factors, or national nonpolitical factors could have easily been equally, if not more
important, than a collection of surveys.
There are also frequent speculations in the media about what specic macroeconomic
or historical indicators are important to creditors:
Italy has a debt-to-GDP ratio slightly above 100 percent, yet its borrowing
costs are manageable, in part because the country hasn't defaulted since the
Benito Mussolini era. That history, plus the perceived protection that comes
from being part of the euro zone, helps Italy sustain its debt burden (Kaiser,
2009).
The above analysis may be correct but could potentially mislead since its list of
variables central to investors' choices may be incomplete.
This paper does not argue that it is not important to monitor movements of interest
rates, that investors make systematic mistakes (or that panic is in principle impossible
and therefore the debt markets must be a perfect reection of the real nancial health
of the sovereigns). Fearful investors could account for some part of the observed spreads,
given that preferences for debt levels, institutional quality and credit ratings appear to
be not to be either constant or the same everywhere. This paper shows that there are
historical and institutional factors that are correlated with long-term interest rates and
could, with caution, be used to shed light on the divergent paths of the EU countries'
rates during the crisis.17
It would be easy to assert that investors are irrational in stormy times. But their
beliefs appear to be (at least to a large extent) based on relevant data.
3 Four hypotheses
3.1 Rationality in bond markets
The rst possibility is that markets reacted rationally to the deteriorating macroeconomic
situation throughout Europe in 2008 and incorporated the price of the newly-emerging
risk of default into sovereign spreads. In other words, markets are always ecient.
But consider a simple coordination game, where two investors (A and B) can choose
to lend or ee. If both players choose to lend, their payo is . If both of them ee, their
payos are zero. If player A lends and player B ees then payos received are (   1;0).
17See, for example, Rodrik (1991); Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996) for evidence that polit-
ical instability leads to lower growth rates (which will be related to long-term rates in Section 4).
9Alternatively, they are (0;   1) if player A ees and player B lends. There is a unique
Nash equilibrium (lend,lend) if  (which can be interpreted as the degree of condence
or absence of credit risk) is greater than 1.18
Coordination problems arise when  2 [0;1].19 It is natural that the risk prole of
county i (i) could fall below one because of a global crisis, particularly if  is a function
of debt, decits, ination and output. In such a case, a speedy departure of investors
from country i can be a rational response to new events and information.
This model of rational behavior fails a simple empirical test: consider the example of
Germany and Greece. From 2000 to 2009 Greece grew faster (or fell more slowly) than
Germany (see Figure 1). But it is clear from the long-term rates that GERMANY > 1
while, given rise in Greek rates in late 2008, it is dicult to argue that GREECE remained
above one. Given our intuition about the composition of , it would appear that this
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Figure 1: Real GDP growth in Greece and Germany (Source: IMF)
18Sale of bonds by the government becomes impossible as  ! 0.
19Trivially, borrowing is impossible if   0.
103.2 Return to normalcy?
A dierent hypothesis is that we observed a \return to normalcy" in the late months of
2008. According to this view, risk had been underpriced in the past and there was a
correction in the market for government debt once the the nancial crisis rang a wake-up
bell.20
Given that the European Union lacks scal coordination and the demographic trends
in some of the member states, the high spreads observed in later 2008 and early 2009
could, in fact, not reect panic21 but instead reect the real situation and creditworthiness
of some countries (which may have enjoyed a \free ride"|low borrowing costs|during
the global boom period when their debt had seemed to be low-risk). This hypothesis is
supported by the fact that spreads of corporate bond yields over government bond yields
were astonishingly low in the past (ECB, 2004).22
This hypothesis by itself, however plausible, does not explain why sovereign spreads
in the EU spiked in late 2008 but then decreased almost across the board by mid-2009.
A volatile behavior of this sort could indicate that the market is still trying to nd the
correct price for risk, but it is dicult to argue that we witnessed normalcy in both 2008
and 2009.
3.3 Panic
The third hypothesis is that panic (or other irrational behaviors, like herd mentality
or excessive pessimism) explain the widening of spreads in 2008 and their subsequent
narrowing.
It has since been argued that spreads may have narrowed in the second half of 2009
because of increased appetite for risk or as a direct consequence of ECB liquidity provision
(Hugh, 2009), so perhaps the height of spreads in 2008 simply reected extreme risk
aversion but no panic. This hypothesis is possibly the hardest one to evaluate unless we
discover \historical brain imaging data" which could reveal whether fear really pushed
investors to act in way they would not have chosen otherwise.
3.4 Multiple-regime investing
The nal (fourth) hypothesis is that investors operate in various regimes. At times,
\soft indicators" like quality of democratic institutions are an important determinant of
their willingness to lend, but in other times, it is not. Reputation of countries (which
is sticky) is not always equally important|just as the importance of macroeconomic
variables in not xed. (This path of reasoning is certainly not revolutionary: Glode,
Hollield, Kacperczyk, and Kogan (2009), for example, show that investor rationality
is time-varying23) This is the hypothesis that is most plausible given recent empirical
20One possible answer is that low spreads were a logical consequence of the reduction of home bias.
ECB (2004) indeed reports that the home bias of euro-area investors was reduced by the adoption of the
common currency.
21Contrary to De Grauwe (2009).
22An important factor was decreasing corporate leverage and the solvency implications.
23They present evidence that the marginal investor in mutual funds does not behave in the same
fashion across dierent market conditions.
11evidence and is explored in the rest of the paper.
4 Simple model
The following static model is a slight modication of the framework used in Baldacci,
Gupta, and Mati (2008). It shows why democratic institutions should lead to lower
borrowing costs through lower long-term rates.
Denition 1. In a country populated by N agents with a simple economy where all
consumption is chosen by the government, let D denote total government debt, c = Y=N
the per capita consumption level, r the market interest rate, g the domestic growth rate
and   the cost of default. Let U(c;D; ) be the utility function that the government seeks
to maximize.
Assumption 1. Uc() > 0, U () < 0, D and   are non-negative. The behavior of
UD is more subtle: for small or moderate values of D and g > 0 (particularly when
(g   r) > 0), UD() > 0 because smooth consumption is preferable to sudden shocks.
When D ! Y ,24 UD is no longer positive because the ability to borrow in the future
may disappear (consumption smoothing becomes impossible). Governments are assumed
to be aware of the trade-o between debt-nanced consumption and easy access to capital
markets.
Assumption 2. Although the model is static, its iteration would require Ct  Yt+(Dt 
Dt 1), where C is the aggregate consumption.
When D  Y a country wants to borrow since it leads to higher utility (ceteris
paribus). If the debt reaches a high level, however, the (real and perceived) probability
of a default increases. There are usually high costs associated with a default25 (such
as seizure of assets, damaged reputation and a more dicult access to global capital
markets), but even such a drastic action may pass the cost-benet test in some situations.
Some countries could expect that creditors will not be able to enforce their rights and
thus perceive the costs of default to be relatively small (see Shleifer, 2003, for an excellent
discussion of the issues involved).26
Naturally, countries can simply owe so much that the expected sum of various costs
borne after a default will be smaller than the present value of the debt itself (D >
E( )). If P is the probability of default then the rational government will indeed suspend
repayments immediately:
Prediction 1. D > E( ) ) P = 1. Conversely, if D < E( ) then 0  P < 1.
24For debt-intolerant countries, this condition becomes D ! Y=2 or even D ! Y=3.
25I ignore the costs levied on neighboring countries, but it obviously does not follow that they do not
exist or are not relevant. A country whose neighbor has defaulted will generally suer for a variety of
reasons, especially the introduction of a belief that the whole geographical area may be in trouble. These
\regional costs" are neglected in this paper, but merit further study.
26For a more formal introduction to debt as a contract, the reader is referred to Hart (1995). For a
description of reputational (implicit) contracts, see Bulow and Rogo (1989).
12E( ) and, implicitly, the likelihood of a default depend on the quality of domestic
nancial institutions, as shown in (as shown in Gennaioli, Martin, and Rossi, 2009).
Given the the rst denition and assumption, we can dene the probability of default
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0 if D = 0.
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Denition 2. Let f(R) = E( ) be an increasing and concave loss function where R is
the reputation of the country, given by the mapping  : c  K   ! R+ [ f0g;(c 2
R+;K 2 [0;1]; 2 R+). The country's reputation is a function of the per capita output
(c), institutional quality (or democratic capital, denoted K) and the budget decit ().
Assumption 4. Rc() > 0, RK() > 0 and R() < 0.
It is natural that richer countries are more credit-worthy and more democratic coun-
tries are more likely to keep its promises. Decits, on the other hand, can deplete a
country's reputation over time since they signal a lack of discipline and (plausibly) an
unsustainable scal path (particularly if g is small). The denition and assumption above
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> 0. It follows that a country
that is able to produce more (or has been democratic for a longer period of time) is less
likely to default and should be required to pay lower interest on its loans. Countries with
high debt level and large budget decits, on the other hand, are more likely to default on
their debt and it is natural for investors to be less willing to lend (or to be only willing
to lend at higher rates).
Prediction 2. If investors can accurately predict the probability of default of country i
and the debt of a benchmark country (Germany, for the purposes of this paper) is riskless
then investors will demand at least a return of at least pi percent per year. If there is
a very small secondary market, a liquidity premium may be required: in that case the
required interest rate will be Pi + i (for some i > 0).
Prediction 3. For two countries i, j if ci = cj;i = j;Di = Dj and Ki < Kj then
Ri < Rj ) Pi > Pj.
Prediction 4. For two countries i, j if Ki = Kj;i = j;Di = Dj and ci < cj then
Ri < Rj ) Pi > Pj.
13Prediction 5. For two countries i, j if ci = cj;Ki = Kj;Di = Dj and i < j then
Ri > Rj ) Pi < Pj.
Prediction 6. For two countries i, j if Ri = Rj and Di < Dj then Pi < Pj.
Remark 1. It is worth noting that governments may in reality not wish to maximize
U(c;D; ): considerations like rent extraction or excessive spending before elections are
ignored in this model.
Remark 2. In some countries, the electorate can tolerate high debt levels, while in other
countries there may be political costs associated with loose scal policy. In the latter case,
government ocials could be motivated to decrease debt by reelection concerns rather than
by rising borrowing cots alone.
5 Data description
The long-term interest data (from which spreads can be calculating by subtracting the
rate of Germany from the given country's 10-year rate) comes from the European Central
Bank.
Period N Average rates Std. Dev. Min Max
2003-2007 26 4.51 0.88 3.89 7.13
2008Q1 26 4.66 0.94 3.93 7.70
2008Q2 26 4.99 0.93 4.22 8.20
2008Q3 26 5.10 0.99 4.13 7.96
2008Q4 26 5.00 1.55 3.19 9.10
2009Q1 26 5.46 2.78 2.89 14.32
2009Q2 26 5.60 2.83 3.32 14.50
Table 1: Summary statistics I: Long-term interest rates
The average long-term rates of EU countries from 2003 to 2007 (including the countries
that joined the union in 200427) was 4.51% and rose gradually to 4.66%, 4.99%, 5.10%
and 5% in the rst four quarters of 2008 and 5.46% and 5.60% in the rst two quarters
of 2009 (as shown in Table 1). The consequences of the changing nancial circumstances
are also apparent in the rising maximum (quarterly) average rates which approximately
doubled between the rst quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009.
Average spreads for the same sample are shown in Table 2. They rose threefold from
early 2008 to mid 2009 and their standard deviation increased from 0.94 to 2.83 and the
standard deviation rose steadily from the second quarter of 2008.
The data on the current account decit, foreign direct investment, trade, govern-
ment expenditure and government debt come from the World Development Indicators
database. The measures of bank soundness (bank liquid reserves to assets) comes from
the IMF. The data on budget balance, unemployment and total population comes from
27Excluding Estonia which has a small debt and \there are currently no suitable long-term government
bonds available on the nancial market" according to ECB.
14Period N Average spreads Std. Dev. Min Max
2003-2007 26 0.62 0.88 0 3.24
2008Q1 26 0.73 0.94 0 3.77
2008Q2 26 0.74 0.93 -0.03 3.95
2008Q3 26 0.84 0.99 -0.13 3.70
2008Q4 26 1.51 1.55 -0.30 5.60
2009Q1 26 2.39 2.78 -0.18 11.24
2009Q2 26 2.28 2.83 0 11.18
Table 2: Summary statistics II: Average spreads
the Economist Intelligence Unit. Credit rating data were transcribed from the Stan-
dard&Poor's website.28
An unusual variable in the setting of government bonds is democratic capital, which
Persson and Tabellini (2009) use to measure a nation's depth of democratic institutions
and the incidence of democracy in its neighborhood.29 Democratic capital is dened on
the unit interval as a depreciable asset that is accumulated every year a country remains
democratic (as dened by a positive score in the Polity IV database). Revolutions, logi-
cally, destroy democratic capital. While Persson and Tabellini (2009) use two depreciation
rates,  = :99 and  = :94, the latter is generally used here in order to avoid making the
assumption that democracy is extremely persistent. The binary variable socialist legal
origin comes from the same dataset.
All these variables, which may in some ways have an impact on a country's borrowing
costs are summarized in Table 3.
5.1 Recent history
For almost all countries, 2007 was a calm period and there was only moderate activity in
the rst three quarters of 2008. But in a time of crisis, investors take their hands o risky
assets, including the debt of countries that do not reach the German standard. Spreads
were quite large in the rst quarter of 2009 but fell moderately in April and May 2009.
Long-term interest rates of Ireland and Greece exceeded 5%, suggesting that the implicit
likelihood of their default may have been higher than 2% per year.
Another powerful eect of the crisis on the bond market was the rapidly rising stan-
dard deviation of average long-term rates. From 2003 to 2007, the standard deviation of
average rates across EU was 0.88|in the last quarter of 2008 it rose to 1.55 and reached
2.83 in the second quarter of 2009 (Table 1).30
28Ratings are generally based on output per capita, strength of government balance sheets, likelihood of
a crisis and institutional maturity. The rst two variables are often included and reported in regressions
but having rating as a separate variable is useful because it is an easily accessible statistic that many
investors follow and take seriously.
29In their sample of 150 countries, they nd that physical and democratic capital have been reinforcing
one another in the past 150 years.
30It is appropriate to ask whether spreads rose because of the decrease in German long-term rates:
their fall does explain some of the rise in spreads, but certainly not all of it.
15Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Average between 2003 and 2007
CA balance 26 -2.30 5.83 -12.37 10.37 WDI
FDI 26 19.20 66.00 0.83 341.97 WDI
Trade in services 26 29.14 31.88 10.26 169.30 WDI
Government expenses (% of GDP) 25 36.48 5.86 24.81 45.40 WDI
Government debt 23 56.75 32.97 4.33 126.39 WDI
Exports 25 54.41 28.75 22.22 151.95 WDI
Bank capital to assets ratio 25 6.87 1.98 3.13 10.98 IMF
Bank liquid reserves to assets 25 5.68 9.84 0.38 48.10 IMF
Average between 2008 and 2009 (estimated)
Budget balance 26 -3.85 2.93 -10.26 0.80 EIU
Unemployment 26 7.81 2.49 3.03 14.91 EIU
Total population 26 19.00 23.41 0.42 82.77 EIU
As of 2009
Credit rating 26 3.62 1.24 1.00 5.00 S&P
Euro (Binary) 26 0.62 0.50 0 1.00 EU
As of 2000
Democractic capital 26 0.38 0.27 0 0.81 P&T
Table 3: Summary statistics III
166 Results
6.1 Pre-crisis period (2003-2007)
6.1.1 Long-term rates
Table 4 shows a collection of simple regressions, where average long-term interest rates
(between 2003 and 2007) are on the left hand side and some combination of variables
(public debt, current account balance, ination31 and the binary euro variable) is on the
right hand side. The simplest univariate regression (1) shows that there was no correlation
between public debt on its own and long-term rates in the 23 EU countries for which the
data is available. When ination added to this simple regression, public debt remains
uncorrelated with interest rates, while high ination is associated with higher rates. These
two regressions do not control for currency, so the premium charged because of currency
risk must bias the coecients in the rst two regressions.
Regressions 3 through 5 include a control variable that is equal to one if a given
country is a member of the euro zone and equal to zero otherwise. When public debt and
this binary variable are the only two independent variables, Euro is negatively correlated
with long-term rates, while public debt remains uncorrelated with them. When the
current account balance is also added to the linear regression (regressions 4 and 5), it
is not signicantly associated with long-term rates (and does not even have the same
sign, though a reasonable expectation would be that surplus countries should pay less
to borrow). In regression 5, debt is positively correlated with long-term interest rates,
euro area membership is negatively correlated and ination is positively correlated with
borrowing costs (controlling for the current account balance).
On average, countries that have adopted the euro paid 0.88 percentage points less
per annum for every euro they borrowed (before the crisis), compared to countries with
other currencies. Under this specication, a three percentage point increase in ination
would be associated with a premium increase of more than 100 basis points (a fairly
important eect). Overall, almost 60% of interest rate variation is explained by the
variables included in regression 5 (but the regression is obviously not bias-free, since few
independent variables are included and it is not inconceivable that large debt and ination
could be correlated; in an ideal world, at least from a \Brussels perspective" euro area
membership and debt would be negatively correlated, but this has not necessarily been
the case).
In Table 5 more control variables are introduced. Specically, almost all regressions
include annual GDP growth, PPP GDP per capita, the percentage of GDP devoted
to exports, and half of the regressions control for total government size (measured in
terms of public expenses over GDP) and the socialist legal origin. If the post-communist
countries are dierent in ways that are not captured by macroeconomic variables, this
control variable should capture some of these historical or institutional factors.
In none of the regressions in Table 5 is public debt signicantly correlated with long-
term rates (although the sign of its coecient is always positive, as one would expect).
Exports, GDP growth and government size are also uncorrelated with ten-year interest
rates. Interestingly human capital appears to be uncorrelated with them as well, although
31Given the ndings of Min (1998), ination and trade are included as independent variables in some
regressions.
17one would expect countries where the population is on average more educated to have
better growth prospects and to be less reliant on nancing from abroad. The only truly
important variable in Table 5 is euro area membership which is negatively and generally
signicantly correlated with borrowing costs of sovereigns in the European Union.
6.1.2 Sovereign spreads
Table 6 examines if macroeconomic variables (along with total population and socialist
legal origin) were correlated with average spreads before the crisis (between 2003 and
2007). Consider regressions 5 through 7: if we control for euro area membership, aver-
age current account balance, average budget decits, the socialist legal origin, ination
(adding the share of bank reserves in the domestic banking system that are liquid into
regression 6, and total population into regression 7), then a 10 percentage point increase
in public debt is predicted to be associated with approximately hundred basis points
increase in spreads. Interestingly, country size does not appear to be correlated with
sovereign spreads, just as budget decits or surpluses have no predictive power in these
linear regressions. As before, EMU members have an advantage and on average have
lower spreads.
Democratic capital
The story becomes more interesting in Table 7, where democratic capital is introduced
as an independent variable (average spreads before the crisis remain on the left-hand
side of the regressions). In 5 out of 6 regressions, democratic capital is signicantly and
negatively correlated with sovereign spreads and the size of the coecients is orders of
magnitude larger than the coecients on other independent variables.
Consider Slovakia, which has a democratic capital of 0.35; in order to reach the Spanish
or Portuguese level of democratic capital, it would need to more than double its current
democratic capital. That may seem extreme, but reaching Slovenia's level of democratic
capital may be a realistic prospect. To do so, Slovakia's democratic capital would need to
rise by 0.08. Even this small increase in democratic capital is associated with a signicant
decrease in borrowing costs according to the regressions in Table 7: holding public debt,
euro area membership, current account balance, bank characteristics and total tax rate
constant, the increase in democratic capital of this magnitude is predicted to lead to
spreads lower by 30 basis points.
This is a very accurate prediction: according to the European Central Bank data,
the average dierence between Slovak and Slovenian spreads between December 2008 in
December 2009 was 31.8 basis points.32 Admittedly, the model performs less well when
dierences in democratic capital are huge. Spain has more than twice as much democratic
capital Slovakia, so the model predicts that the Spanish spreads should be lower than
Slovak spreads by approximately 1.5 percentage points. That almost happened in July
2006, but in general Spanish spreads were no more 1 percentage point lower than Slovak
32Here we are checking whether pre-crisis data can possibly be used to predict spreads in 2009: to
some extent, it can, but usual limitations of simple regressions apply. The point is to check whether
some variables perform better than others, and it is democratic capital that at least comes close to being
a satisfactory \guide" to dierences between sovereign spreads.
18spreads between 2003 and 2007 (and they averaged 73 basis points between December
2008 and December 2009).
6.2 The crisis hits (2008Q4)
Let us return to the framework without democratic capital and check whether, and to
what degree, economic variables inuenced spreads in late 2008. Ination and euro area
membership were signicantly correlated with sovereign spreads before the crisis (even
when democratic capital was held constant) but even these two variables fail to predict
the behavior of sovereign spreads in the fourth quarter of 2008. As can be seen in Table
8, almost no variables were signicantly correlated with sovereign spreads at that time.
The only consistent predictor of spreads in late 2008 were credit ratings. The coecients
are fairly large: an improvement from a single A rating to AA (or, equivalently, from
from AA to AAA) was associated with spreads lower by 90 to 120 basis points (holding
constant public debt, euro area membership, current account balance, budget balance
and ination).
Table 9 also includes democratic capital as one of the independent variables: under
simple specications, democratic capital remained signicant even in late 2008 but when
the control variables like ination and GDP growth are added, democratic capital is
no longer correlated with sovereign spreads (in this specic time window). Interestingly
public debt, euro area membership and budget balance were not associated with sovereign
spreads in 2008. It is possible, however, that investors did pay attention to credit ratings
which enter the regressions with signicant and negative coecients.33
6.3 The weight of credit ratings
In Table 10, dependent variables change in every column. For example, spreads in the
rst quarter of 2008 are the dependent variable in regression 1; regressions are run for
the following 5 quarters (with the same set of independent variables on the right-hand
side). Democratic capital, debt, EMU membership, current account balance and exports
are held constant to check whether credit rating was correlated in with spreads in early
2008. In fact, its correlation with spreads depends on the specic time window.
In the third quarter of 2008, credit rating started to matter signicantly (one move up
the grading scale was associated with lower spreads by 53 basis points, ceteris paribus).
In the following quarter, credit rating remained signicant (but its eect rose more than
twofold to 124 basis points) and in the rst quarter of 2009 it stayed signicant and its
coecient exploded to 265 basis points. No other variable included in these regressions
was signicantly correlated with sovereign spreads. While the equations are problematic
(some correlation between independent variables cannot be avoided), the results could be
interpreted as suggesting that the importance of a good credit rating increased dramati-
cally during the toughest period of the nancial crisis.
33Naturally, credit ratings are correlated with total public debt, and even with democratic capital, as
can be seen in the last two gures.
197 Conclusion
In a way, it is a puzzle that some variables (most conspicuously, democratic capital) can
be very important in one period (2003-2007) and become virtually irrelevant only months
later. The regressions alone do not \prove" that tastes (preferences of creditors) have
changed, since an obscure omitted variable could, in principle, be the true explanation of
the observed results. The evidence does suggest that political institutions matter even if
they fail to achieve their stated goals, like capping total debt. A reasonable conjecture is
that their impact would be even stronger if governments were less prone to overspending
and willing to live within (or suciently close to) their means.
The results' implication that democratic capital may (at least sometimes) be even
more \guilty" of shaping the height of sovereign spreads than the usual (purely eco-
nomic) suspects is in some sense disturbing. If democracy (checks and balances, con-
tained corruption, regular election and so forth) make investors willing to lend, where
will the incentives to maintain debt levels below 60% of domestic GDP come from?34 An
institutional reform introducing truly painful sanction could in theory discipline govern-
ments but the political economy of the \punishment process" is unpredictable and could
easily degenerate due to exceptions, extensions for reaching the required scal goals or
even threats on the part of those who break the rules and know that nobody desires a
protracted conict.
A simple model that ignores political factors and focuses mostly on macroeconomic
variables (its only political factor is reputations costs stemming from a default) does not
perform well : budget decits were not correlated with spreads (or long-term interest
rates) at all, and public debt was only sometimes truly correlated with spreads, often
with negligible coecients.
The advantages of studying a monetary union are appealing. The fact that currency
risk becomes a non-issue in the analysis of spreads motivated this paper in the rst place.
However, the unavoidable cost is that non-economic issues come into play almost by
denition in a union created not by the market but by public ocials. There may, for
instance, be implicit expectations that the members of the union will \stick together"
if one of the countries becomes insolvent; if such expectations (especially on the part of
governments) exist, then the costs of default are lower in equilibrium and a default may
actually inict contained losses on creditors if a country is (to a large enough extent)
bailed out: these political economy considerations make the analysis of the market for
government bonds much more challenging and a satisfactory solution of the game played
between stronger and weaker member states may require a book-length treatment.
In spite of these complications, some lessons can be learned from the empirical results.
This paper rejected simple explanations of the explosion of spreads in the EU in late 2008
and presented evidence that creditors care about economic and non-economic variables.
Investors do not always behave in the same fashion: they probably recalibrate or update
the relative importance of county characteristics like credit rating and democratic capital,
34For a serious attempt to start a debate on this subject, see Horvath and Odor (2009) who call for
more accountability and transparency through an establishment of a Council for Fiscal Sustainability.
Their proposal to adopt rules building on top of those that already exist may indeed be necessary to
motivate elected ocials to keep medium- and long-term goals in mind. In order to avoid creative
accounting, independent monitoring (with sucient power and legitimacy to inuence policy) will be
undoubtedly important as dust settles after the most far-reaching economic crisis in recent history.
20which suggests that (1) a country's borrowing costs depend not only on local but also on
global conditions, (2) countries with long democratic tradition in the EU, relative to its
new members, enjoy a reputational advantage and (3) scal consolidation is a noble goal
but it may not guarantee low rates, because creditors, to some degree, value variables
that are beyond the control of present-day policymakers.
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24(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Central government debt 0.00146 0.00290 0.00725 0.00554 0.00919*
(0.00259) (0.00286) (0.00396) (0.00411) (0.00374)
Euro -0.929* -0.797 -0.878**
(0.439) (0.423) (0.296)
Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.0305 0.0246
(0.0191) (0.0246)
Inflation 0.381* 0.356*  
(0.170) (0.145)
Constant 4.289*** 3.176*** 4.566*** 4.523*** 3.363***
(0.189) (0.478) (0.281) (0.294) (0.435)
Observations 23 23 23 23 23
Adjusted R^2 -0.043 0.361 0.247 0.267 0.591




Table 4: Pre-crisis long-term rates
Dependent variable: Averate pre-crisis interest rates (2003-2007)Dependent variable: Averate pre-crisis interest rates (2003-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Central gov. debt (% GDP)  0.0111 -0.0150 0.00768 0.00568 0.00397 0.00413
(0.00763) (0.0156) (0.00586) (0.00609) (0.00639) (0.00613)
Exports of goods, services (% GDP) 0.00640 0.00536 0.0126 0.00470 0.00904 0.00882
(0.00591) (0.00449) (0.00801) (0.00521) (0.00746) (0.00747)
Euro -1.029+ -0.712* -0.840+ -0.759 -0.989* -1.048*
(0.550) (0.289) (0.444) (0.482) (0.380) (0.408)
GDP growth (annual %) 03-07 0.0509 0.0563 -0.0130 0.0591 -0.0682 -0.0696
(0.0598) (0.0720) (0.0539) (0.105) (0.0834) (0.0898)
Interest payments (% of revenue) 0.222
(0.147)
Expense (% of GDP) 0.0219 0.0606 0.0599
(0.0227) (0.0367) (0.0380)




Unemployment (%) 08-09 0.135+ 0.133+
(0.0632) (0.0674)
Past domestic democratic capital -0.300
(0.927)
Constant 3.876** 3.600** 4.629** 3.885* 1.213 1.332
(0.578) (0.663) (0.554) (1.576) (1.589) (1.739)
GDP per head (PPP, 08-09) included YES YES YES YES
Observations 22 21 22 18 21 21
Adjusted R-squared 0.234 0.409 0.318 0.387 0.498 0.458




Table 5: Pre-crisis long-term rates IIDependent variable: Pre-crisis spreads (average spreads between 2003 and 2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Central government debt total (% of GDP) 0.00148 0.00727+ 0.0114+ 0.0148+ 0.0105* 0.0104* 0.00992*
(0.00258) (0.00395) (0.00608) (0.00824) (0.00417) (0.00450) (0.00400)
Euro -0.930* -0.476+ -0.461+ -0.719* -0.564 -0.717*
(0.439) (0.246) (0.243) (0.333) (0.472) (0.334)
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.0191 0.0421 0.0290 0.0163 0.0226
(0.0296) (0.0313) (0.0297) (0.0294) (0.0268)
Recent budget balance (% of GDP) -0.0225 -0.0440 0.0126 0.0334 0.0294
(0.0323) (0.0272) (0.0358) (0.0438) (0.0362)
Socialist legal origin 1.115+ 1.392* 0.421 0.739 0.372
(0.550) (0.580) (0.456) (0.724) (0.446)
Total tax rate (% of profit) -0.0121
(0.0108)
Inflation 0.331* 0.289 0.350+
(0.156) (0.165) (0.168)




Constant 0.399* 0.677* -0.203 0.0157 -0.612 -0.483 -0.634
(0.188) (0.281) (0.398) (0.416) (0.539) (0.541) (0.563)
Observations 23 23 23 21 23 22 23
Adjusted R-squared -0.043 0.247 0.384 0.398 0.577 0.550 0.564




Table 6: Pre-crisis spreadsDependent variable: Pre-crisis spreads (average spreads between 2003 and 2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Central government debt total (% of GDP) 0.00603 0.00869+ 0.0118+ 0.0111* 0.0100+ 0.0161*
(0.00354) (0.00450) (0.00618) (0.00389) (0.00566) (0.00658)
Democratic capital (δ = .94) -1.820* -1.285* -2.806+ -0.739 -2.392+ -3.584*
(0.828) (0.607) (1.551) (1.297) (1.323) (1.653)
Euro -0.677* -0.609 -0.861+ -0.509 -0.589
(0.312) (0.397) (0.409) (0.333) (0.427)
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.0274 0.0524 0.0666 0.0384
(0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0503) (0.0283)
Bank liquid reserves to bank assets ratio (%)  -0.108 0.00511 -0.141 -0.165





Total tax rate (% of profit) -0.0170
(0.00959)
Constant 1.607* 1.456* 2.796+ -0.0638 3.954+ 4.156*
(0.682) (0.585) (1.493) (1.177) (2.123) (1.691)
Observations 22 22 21 21 21 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.256 0.374 0.355 0.612 0.372 0.369




Table 7: Pre-crisis spreads IIDependent variable: Average spreads in 2008Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Central government debt total (% of GDP) 0.00287 -0.00466 -0.00621 -0.00337 -0.000396 -0.00350 0.00171
(0.00685) (0.00708) (0.00763) (0.00723) (0.00783) (0.00559) (0.00834)
Euro -1.531+ -0.949 -0.839 -0.922 -0.767 -0.678 -0.761
(0.862) (0.726) (0.717) (0.683) (0.719) (0.480) (0.476)
Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.134* -0.161* -0.136* -0.157* 0.0878 0.0752
(0.0395) (0.0530) (0.0631) (0.0483) (0.0569) (0.0505)
Budget balance (% of GDP) 08-09 0.0830 0.0957 0.132+ -0.0494 0.00311
(0.0874) (0.0834) (0.0734) (0.0433) (0.0531)
Budget revenue (% of GDP) 08-09 -0.0346
(0.0299)
GDP (% real change pa) 08-09 -0.168+ -0.0771
(0.0865) (0.0836)




Constant 5.653* 5.463* 5.762* 7.180* 5.250* 9.934* 7.612*
(0.725) (0.536) (0.697) (1.115) (0.721) (1.188) (1.969)
Observations 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
Adjusted R-squared 0.166 0.420 0.409 0.401 0.462 0.673 0.707




Table 8: Crisis spreadsDependent variable: Average spreads in 2008Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democratic capital (δ = .94) -4.354* -3.780* -2.563 -2.719 -4.691* -3.264 -0.0196 0.660
(1.494) (1.412) (1.998) (2.358) (1.972) (1.987) (2.534) (2.956)
Central government debt total (% of GDP) 0.00501 0.00786 0.00282 0.00356 0.0194 0.0175 -0.00229 -0.00131
(0.00541) (0.00679) (0.00878) (0.0105) (0.0115) (0.0108) (0.0143) (0.0139)
Euro -0.725 -0.696 -0.705 -0.542 -0.715 -0.623 -0.765
(0.636) (0.639) (0.674) (0.519) (0.491) (0.473) (0.510)
Current account balance (% of GDP) -0.0638 -0.0541 0.0345 0.0342 0.0750 0.0697
(0.0606) (0.0861) (0.0947) (0.0879) (0.0752) (0.0596)
Budget balance (% of GDP) 08-09 -0.0159 -0.0144 0.0298 -0.0344 0.00706
(0.0811) (0.111) (0.106) (0.0506) (0.0637)
GDP (% real change pa) 08-09 -0.257* -0.246* -0.0321 -0.0497
(0.0994) (0.0925) (0.102) (0.125)
Inflation 0.372+ 0.328
(0.202) (0.334)
Credit rating -1.159* -1.016+
(0.399) (0.519)
Constant 8.077* 7.916* 7.091* 7.134* 7.360* 5.534* 9.661* 7.766*
(1.375) (1.271) (1.646) (1.768) (1.075) (1.405) (1.403) (2.137)
Observations 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Adjusted R-squared 0.446 0.462 0.462 0.429 0.579 0.637 0.634 0.678




Table 9: Crisis spreads with democratic capital(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2008Q1 2008Q2 2008Q3 2008Q4 2009Q1 2009Q2
Credit rating -0.253 -0.333 -0.531* -1.124** -2.654** -2.671**
(0.205) (0.216) (0.215) (0.328) (0.875) (0.817)
Euro -0.753 -0.784 -0.563 -0.747 -0.834 -0.964
(0.476) (0.510) (0.441) (0.583) (0.660) (0.599)
Central government debt  total (% of GDP) 0.00945 0.00767 0.00300 -0.00184 -0.0294 -0.0337
(0.00958) (0.0101) (0.00855) (0.0108) (0.0177) (0.0161)
Democratic capital (δ = .94) -0.728 -0.216 0.206 0.802 4.117 3.661
(1.060) (1.059) (1.135) (1.602) (2.842) (2.663)
Current account balance (% of GDP) 0.00873 0.00112 0.00911 0.0179 0.0466 0.0751
(0.0391) (0.0429) (0.0398) (0.0572) (0.110) (0.102)
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 0.00794 0.00756 0.00545 0.00666 0.000751 -0.00174
(0.00881) (0.00927) (0.00805) (0.0102) (0.0138) (0.0125)
Constant 5.645*** 6.040*** 6.767*** 8.705*** 14.19** 15.24***
(1.089) (1.155) (0.999) (1.240) (3.917) (3.679)
Observations 21 21 21 21 21 21
Adjusted R-squared 0.354 0.343 0.463 0.663 0.633 0.671
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Slope of the trend line is -0.41. 
 
Slope of the trend line is -1.03. 
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BB                              BBB                              A                               AA                           AAA     APPENDIX
A What can countries do to lower their spreads?
A.1 Making tax collection more ecient
A simplication of the tax laws, for example through the introduction of a at tax
(which has, in recent years, been popular among policymakers in Eastern Europe) could,
if designed well, lead to higher revenues which could be used to reduce decits or even to
decrease debt levels. Such steps would be particularly helpful for some Western European
countries.
Paulus and Peichl (2009) nd that, although an introduction of a at tax will generally
increase eciency and decrease equity, in countries such as Spain, Portugal and Greece,
both of these phenomena are likely to increase, should a tax reform of this kind be
introduced.35 However, Fuest, Peichl, and Schaefer (2008), who simulate the eects of
at tax introduction on Germany, conclude that it is unlikely to spill over from Eastern
Europe.
A.2 Unpopular reforms
According to Alesina and Giavazzi (2006) deregulation of labor and product markets in
the EU would lead to higher growth rates. More recently, Rogo (2009) wrote that \if
Europe continues to make its labor markets more exible, its nancial market regulation
more genuinely pan-European, and remains open to trade, trend growth can pick up
again in the wake of the crisis."
Other useful reforms include creation of favorable conditions for immigration of skilled
workers, decreasing the costs of having children or shrinking the size of the shadow
economy by making it easier and less costly to run businesses.
A.3 Credible scal outlook and more discipline
In an environment where few sanctions are associated with excessive spending, trust
cannot be maintained. (See a brief discussion of Horvath and Odor (2009) in footnote 34
on page 20.)
35In countries where income inequalities are less severe and a middle class is solidly established, dis-
tributional eects of a at tax may be less favorable.
39